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Abstract
The paper describes an on-going research project that uses agency theory and the concept of
information asymmetry to explore possibilities in decreasing project escalation in outsourced
information systems (IS) development projects. We analysed three IS development methods for this
purpose. As results of the analysis we proposed a framework for studying the information asymmetries
of IS development methods. The framework includes three features that are interrelated to each other,
namely sharing agent behavior and outcome information and information sharing system. We used the
framework to study standard contract terms for IS development in Finland (IT2000). Specifically, we
wanted to see if the features of the proposed framework are visible in IT2000 contract. The results
were promising in that aspect. Moreover, we found that IT2000 contract does not take well into
account the more flexible agile IS development methods and can therefore lead into higher
information asymmetries in IS development projects than would be typical for flexible development
methods. Hence, we conclude that this area should be further investigated to understand how the
framework could be used in IS development projects to decrease project escalation. This research will
extend our understanding of the reasons behind project escalation in IS development projects.
Keywords: information asymmetry, agent theory, IS development methods, agile software
development, Extreme programming, outsourcing, IT contracting.
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INTRODUCTION

Studies show that every third information systems (IS) development project suffer from some kind of
symptom of project escalation, e.g. (Keil, Mann et al. 2000), and thus development projects are likely
to exceed budget constraints, go overtime, demand more resources than expected etc. Furthermore, IS
development outsourcing has been a topic of lively discussion lately. Even though many success
stories exist, there are many outsourced projects that Keil et al (2000) might describe as “runway”
projects. One reason researchers have presented is that many outsourcing contracts have been very
complex and contained multiple clauses aimed at reducing unexpected contingencies, possible cost
increases, and opportunistic service provider behaviour (Lee, Huynh et al. 2003). Furthermore, agile
IS development methods have gained much interest among academics and practitioners (Boehm and
Turner 2003; Erickson, Lyytinen et al. 2005), which do not often emphasize project management
features present with more traditional IS development methods (Merisalo-Rantanen, Rossi et al. 2005).
The fact that projects are tempted to run wild is no new thing in IS literature. The literature is rich with
suggestions for decreasing failure risks by concentrating attention to one risk source, such as
requirements determination and analysis or managing development process more efficiently.
Recently, researchers have also taken interest in understanding the more in-depth reasons that could
possibly cause of the phenomena. Keil et al (2000) suggests that major factors which relate to
escalation are project complexity and completion effect. Hence, they have presented that the use of
avoidance theory could feasibly explain the reasons behind project escalation. However, their study
touched the use of agency theory as well. They found that if information asymmetry was present, there
was sevenfold increase in project escalation (Keil, Mann et al. 2000). Furthermore, researchers have
suggested that reducing information asymmetry is an important topic when you consider feasibility of
IS development methods to a particular development task (Peffers and Tuunanen 2005). However, we
were not able to find literature that would consider using a particular IS development method to reduce
information asymmetry within a project. Hence, we find interesting to compare potential benefits
arriving from the use of agile development methods vs. more traditional IS development methods.
The paper approaches to investigate how agency theory, and more specifically information
asymmetry, could be used to decrease project escalation in IS development projects. We will take IS
development methods as the target of our investigation and focus into three general and well-known
methods: waterfall, simple iterative and agile software development. The selection of the IS
development methods includes two important polar extremes, namely traditional waterfall model and
newer extreme programming model. The third method included, iterative process model represents a
middle of the road approach of software development. We conceptually analyze these methods in
order to estimate their support for providing aid for reducing information asymmetry. Finally, we use
the findings of the analysis to examine how the most common Finnish IT outsourcing contract
framework supports reducing information asymmetry.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly review the selected IS development
methods and their characteristics. This is followed by a review of agency theory and conceptual
analysis of the two IS development methods. Then we use our findings to investigate how IT2000
contracts supports reducing information asymmetry. Finally, we discuss the results and conclude.
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RELATED WORK

2.1

IS development methods

The history of IS development can be characterized as a venture to find solutions for raising the
productivity of programmers, making systems less defective or developing systems by techniques that
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pay more attention to the end-users and their needs. The story of process improvement in IS
development methods began with the ‘code-and-fix’ approach, which can be perhaps described as a
creative state of chaos (Merisalo-Rantanen, Rossi et al. 2005). This ad hoc way of working was
blamed for containing many problems, like poorly understood requirements and problematical
structure of coding and resulting in project escalation. We review briefly three exemplary IS
development methods developed to resolve these issues. The main characteristics of the methods are
described in Figure 1. The ‘waterfall model’ was developed to provide a systematic, sequential
solution to IS development problems. It is often illustrated as a fixed sequence of consecutive steps of
development phases (Royce 1970). While exact step contents and naming conventions vary according
authors, the main idea remains simple: plan carefully first, then implement and at last test exhaustively
(Sommerville 2001). The next step in the history of method development was a turn towards more
flexible methods. This led to the development of iterative models in 1980s (Raccoon 1997). In below,
we have illustrated a general iterative method. Basically, it is an incremental method where the project
is divided into small waterfalls. In this example, the specification is frozen for a single increment, but
the specifications of other increments may change (Mills 1980). Finally, the emergence of agile
methods started in late 1990s with Extreme programming (XP) being one of the first and better known
agile methodologies (Beck 1999; Erickson, Lyytinen et al. 2005; Merisalo-Rantanen, Rossi et al.
2005). The driving forces for the new methods were the fast changing requirements and technology. In
some areas of software development the change was considered so fast that the specification couldn’t
be frozen even for a single, few months’ long iteration. Agile methods give typically only a little
weight for writing documents and instead emphasizes working software and very flexible development
process with a strong customer focus through out the whole development process (Beck 1999).

Figure 1: waterfall, iterative and agile models, modified from (Beck 1999)
2.2

Agency theory and Information Asymmetry

Agency theory extended the research of risk sharing in the early 1970 by introducing so-called agency
problem to the research (Ross 1973; Eisenhardt 1989). The theory describes a relationship between a
principal who delegates work to an agent, who then performs that work. The central notion of the
theory is so called agency problem which occurs when the principal and the agent have conflicting
goals and it is expensive or difficult for the principal to determine whether the agent has behaved
appropriately (Eisenhardt 1989).
Eisenhardt (1989) states in her review of agency theory that traditionally the agency problem has been
solved by (a) reducing the information asymmetry and (b) creating reward based incentives for the
agent. Her review concludes that information asymmetry can be reduced by establishing various
information systems between the agent and the principle in for an example form of frequent progress
reports. Initially, Sharing agent behavior information should reduce the agent’s temptation of moral
hazard and other unwanted behavior as the risk of getting caught acting against principal’s interest
raises (Eisenhardt 1989). The other widely used approach is to tie agent’s rewards to the project
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outcomes, opposed to the standard behavior based rewards to the agent (Ekanayake 2004). The
motivation of outcome based reward is to establish incentive for the agent to act according the
principal’s best interest and transfer the principal’s goals to the agent (Ekanayake 2004). However,
outcome based rewards transfer not only the principal’s goals but also principal’s risks to the agent
(Ekanayake 2004), and thus this could be described as sharing project outcome information. The third
and last way of reducing information asymmetry according to the agency theory is to establish a
dedicated information sharing system between the agent and the vendor (Eisenhardt 1989). According
Eisenhardt (1989), these information sharing systems are for example agreed upon ways of reporting
the project status.
Lichtenstein (2004) has presented that agency theory could be applied to IS development contracting.
According to him the client (principal) and the vendor (agent) are likely to have conflicting goals for
the contracting project and their risk preference regarding to the project can be different. In addition of
the self-evident contradiction between maximizing vendor profit and minimizing client cost, the goals
regarding the ease of software maintenance, software robustness and long-term system effectiveness
are similarly likely to be different to at least some extent. Furthermore, information asymmetry
between the client and the vendor is likely to be very high, because a piece of modern software is a
highly complex engineering artefact and most definitely client organization cannot understand all the
technical details of it. Finally, Lichtenstein (2004) states that high information asymmetry makes the
software contracting principal-agent relationship prone to moral hazard and adverse selection and that
agent may, for example, reserve excess amount of time for even simple tasks and then over charge the
client.
In context of software contracting fixed price projects can be seen as an outcome based reward for the
vendor. When the project price is fixed, the vendor has a strong incentive to complete the project
under budget. As agency theory predicts, using a fixed pricing scheme not only transfers the goals
from the client to the vendor but also the risks (Lichtenstein 2004). On the other hand, the possibility
of giving intellectual property rights (IPR) to the vendor is another way of base the reward on the
project outcome. The release of IPR to the vendor can establish a strong shared incentive of software
quality between the client and the vendor (Eisenhardt 1989).
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CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF IS DEVELOPMENT METHODS

We have chosen the reviewed three IS development methods as a target for our conceptual analysis,
namely waterfall, general iterative and agile development methods. All of the above methods provide
interesting built-in ways of reducing the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent.
Table 1 summarises our analysis of the methods. It presents the selected IS development methods in
the context of agency theory.
Sharing agent behavior information. According to agency theory, understanding how agent
conducts his work is very important for principle (Eisenhardt 1989). Therefore it is interesting to
analyse how the development methods share information about the vendor behaviour. We have a
similar view with Boehm et al. (2003) that the interactions between the client and the vendor of plan
driven models are conducted on demand and therefore are usually infrequent compared to the agile
models, where interactions are conducted through dedicated onsite customers on daily basis. On
waterfall model, the principal cannot really assess the agent’s behavior directly, because the
interaction is based on demand, and if there is no problems to solve, the agent maybe be working quite
a long times without any interactions with the principal (Boehm and Turner 2003). However, the
outcomes of a single waterfall model step provide the principal an indirect way of assessing the
agent’s behaviour. Agile development potentially gives the principal rather much information about
the agent’s behavior assuming the principal is capable of understanding the software development
activities on some level. The key factor is agile models’ emphasis on the informal and very frequent
interactions between the principal and the agent as the client is supposed to dedicate full time
employee to the development project as an onsite customer. From a principal’s point of view, literally
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being full time where the actual work is done provides potentially outstanding means of understanding
the agent’s behavior (Beck 1999).

Ways of reducing information
asymmetry

Information system development methods
Waterfall model
Iterative models

Extreme programming

Sharing agent
After each model step
behavior information

After each model step

Real time information via
on-site customer

Sharing project
Only after whole project
outcome information

After each iteration
(frequency: months)

After each iteration
(frequency: weeks)

Information sharing
system

Outcomes of model
steps

Working software once Working software once in
in few months, outcomes few weeks, onsite
of model steps
customer

Over all relative
information
asymmetry

High

Medium

Low

Table 1: IS development methods and principal-agent information asymmetries (Beck 1999;
Sommerville 2001; Boehm and Turner 2003)
Sharing project outcome information. While agency theory emphasizes understanding the behavior
of the agent, in the end the buyer of IS development project cares only about the concrete outcome of
the project. Therefore reducing uncertainty of the project outcome is very valuable for the principal.
Waterfall and agile models reduce the uncertainty of the project outcome very much differently
assuming the most important project outcome to the principal is the working information systems.
While waterfall delivers the working information systems only after the whole project is finished
(Sommerville 2001), the agile models deliver pieces of fully working information systems after each
short iteration (Beck 1999). Hence, information asymmetry of waterfall model is concluded to remain
high because principal assess agent’s behavior only occasionally (Boehm and Turner 2003) and will
see the project outcome, working information systems, only after the whole information systems is
implemented (Sommerville 2001). Compared to the waterfall, iterative model lowers the information
asymmetry in one significant way: a piece of working information systems is revealed to the principal
after each iteration (Sommerville 2001) and therefore the information asymmetry is regarded to be
medium in the presented framework. However, the lowest information asymmetry is found from agile
development as principal can assess the agent’s behavior daily via on-site customer and the pieces of
working information systems is presented to the principal more frequently as the iteration cycles are
shorter (Beck 1999).
Information sharing system describes agreed upon ways of delivering project artefacts, for example
documentation or software components to the project client. With waterfall we can state that built-in
information sharing systems relate to individual phases of the method. Each phase delivers an artefact,
beginning with requirements determination and ending with the working information system. The
iterative methods add prototypes and other early versions of the information system to this. Hence, its
capability of reducing information asymmetry is considered to be better. Finally, agile software
development increases the iteration frequency with providing weekly or bi-weekly builds of the
information system. Furthermore, it emphasises the informal information exchange between the
principal and the agent as it is preferred that the customer has on-site representation.
Over-all relative information asymmetries summarizes the over all information asymmetries of the
process models. It’s worth noting that this synthesis is by no means meant to be absolute, moreover it
is relative in its nature. Information asymmetry of waterfall model is concluded to remain high
because principal assess agent’s behavior only occasionally (Boehm and Turner 2003) and will see the
project outcome, working information systems, only after the whole information systems is
implemented (Sommerville 2001). Compared to the waterfall, iterative model lowers the information
asymmetry in one significant way: a piece of working information systems is revealed to the principal
after each iteration (Sommerville 2001) and therefore the information asymmetry is regarded to be
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medium in the presented framework. However, the lowest information asymmetry is found from agile
software development as principal can assess the agent’s behavior daily via on-site customer and the
pieces of working information systems is presented to the principal more frequently as the iteration
cycles are shorter (Beck 1999).

4

CASE STUDY OF IT2000 OUTSOURCING CONTRACT

In this section we briefly describe the Finnish industry standard contract terms for IS development
(later IT2000) (Keskuskauppakamari 2000) and analyze it using the developed framework (Table 1).
Our purpose is to examine how IT2000 contract supports information asymmetry when the main IS
development method is an agile model. The contract framework has been derived from the traditional
IS development perspective and it includes strong support for waterfall method. For example IT2000
framework strongly assumes upfront specification as the purpose of IT2000 EAP is essentially to
implement a well-documented written specification. Correspondingly acceptance testing and warranty
of IT2000 EAT contract refers only to the documented functional specification. Our analysis of
IT2000 framework and the agile models showed deep contradiction between the two as the very core
idea of agile development is to agree the functional definition during the implementation phase and
focus on the working software instead of exhaustive documentation (Beck 1999).
IT2000 terms and conditions are written by collective of Finnish governmental officials, information
technology industry associations and buyer representatives1. For the scope of this research, only the
general terms and conditions (IT2000 YSE) and special terms and conditions for the deliveries of
customised software (IT2000 EAT) apply. Table 2 presents the information asymmetry related
features of IT2000 EAT contract in relation to our framework of information asymmetry of IS
development methods (Table 1).
Ways of reducing
information asymmetry

IT2000 EAT features
Sharing agent
Minimum requirement for project organization: a project steering
behavior information group and a project manager
Sharing project
Vendor receives automatically intellectual property rights and
outcome information therefore benefits directly from good quality software product
Information sharing
system

Minimum requirements for reporting: progress report at least once
a month

Table 2: information asymmetry related features of IT2000 EAT contracts (Eisenhardt 1989;
Keskuskauppakamari 2000)
Sharing agent behavior information. Clear project organization is a basic requirement for a good
agency problem solution. If the project organization is poor, the information flow between the
principal and the agent is very likely to remain inadequate, and the unwanted agent behavior may
therefore increase. IT2000 requires the parties to set up a project steering group to implement the
agreement and to generally organize the co-operation. (IT2000 EAT, 4.1) The vendor is required to
appoint a project manager who will report the status and progress of the project to the steering group.
(IT2000 EAT, 4.2)
Sharing project outcome information. Our analysis showed that the aspect of the sharing project
outcome information in the context of IT2000 is more focused on rewards the vendor can gain than
sharing the information in more equal manner. Namely, the IT2000 framework provides the
intellectual property rights to the vendor which can be seen as a form of outcome based reward
1

Keskuskauppakamari, Suomen Logistiikkayhdistys ry, Tietotekniikan Liitto ry and Tietotekniikan Palveluliitto TIPAL ry.
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(Lichtenstein 2004). The rationality is that as the vendor gains the intellectual property rights, wellimplemented project serves also the best interests of the vendor because the vendor can reuse the
outcome with multiple other clients (Eisenhardt 1989). However, while good quality product may be
in the best interests of both sides, some other agency problem related issues might raise because of the
way the intellectual property rights are managed in the IT2000 framework. Vendor might set
completely different goals for the product than the client has originally asked because of the future
reuse and resell potentials. For an example, the vendor might start building a whole product platform
within the project while the client only asked the simplest possible working solution.
Information-sharing system. In terms of agency theory, the required reports are an information
system that provides the principal with information about the behavior of the agent. The IT2000
requires supplier to report on the progress of the project in writing at least once every month. If the
project pricing scheme is time and material, the monthly report has to include information on the
working time used (IT2000 EAT 6.1). In order to apply for small projects, the reporting system is kept
light weight, and therefore the reporting system provides only relatively small influence to the agency
problem. For bigger and riskier projects, the reporting system could be easily extended to cover more
detailed and more frequent information flow from the vendor to the client.

5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The paper explores the possibility of using agency theory and the concept of information asymmetry
in order to aid to decrease project escalation in outsourced IS development projects. We analysed three
IS development methods for this purpose. As a results of the analysis we proposed a framework (table
1) for examining the information asymmetries of IS development methods. The preliminary findings
propose that this field has potential in understanding how information asymmetries, like Keil et al
(2000) have suggested earlier.
Our framework includes three features that are interrelated to each other. These were results of a
conceptual analysis of agency theory and IS development method literatures. Initially we see that
sharing agent behavior information is a key for understanding the dynamics how the principal and the
agent are interacting together. We share the view of Boehm et al. (2003) that the interactions between
the client and the vendor differ based on the selected IS development method, i.e. plan driven models
usually interact with the client less frequently compared to the agile methods. Secondly, we present
that sharing project outcome information differs among IS development methods as they reduce the
uncertainty of the project outcome in distinctly different ways. This is an outcome of the different
view on producing iterations of IS artefacts (Beck 1999; Sommerville 2001). Finally, we propose that
IS development methods differ in ways they provide information-sharing system in relation to
information asymmetry. Our conceptual analysis of the selected methods shows that the relative
information asymmetry is likely to remain high in waterfall projects, medium in iterative projects and
low in agile projects.
Furthermore, we used the developed framework to examine one of the most common standard contract
terms for IS development in Finland (IT2000) (Keskuskauppakamari 2000). Specifically, we wanted
to examine if the proposed three items of our framework are visible in IT2000 contract that is often
used in outsourcing projects in Finland and if the features share the view given by the agency theory
literature. The results of the case study were encouraging. They support the use of our framework and
further research in the area. Our analysis illustrate that sharing agent behavior information and
information-sharing system were present as suggested by the literature. However, we found that even
though agency theory recommends sharing project outcome information (Eisenhardt 1989; Ekanayake
2004) IS development methods and IT2000 contract take a contradicting view to the matter. It can be
said that traditionally IS development methods safe guard principal’s interests, whereas IT2000
contract more focuses on agents’ rewards. What's more, we found that the IT2000 contract framework
does not take well into account the more flexible IS agile development methods, like extreme
programming. From perspective of agency theory, information system development project may be
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forced to choose between committing to agile methodology or using IT2000 contract framework.
Choosing IT2000 over agile development may potentially increase information asymmetries in IS
development projects. This is worrying finding since researchers have claimed that this can cause even
sevenfold increase in project escalation (Keil, Mann et al. 2000).
In the next phase of the study we will do an interpretive case study of an outsourced IS development
project. With the case study we aim to elaborate how information sharing affects principal’s and
agent’s behavior and how the information sharing system for the project is constructed. What features
it includes and how it is supposed to support the development project. Furthermore, we find it
interesting if we could extent the discussion to acquisition of package software. This would probably
lead to further elaboration of the contextual factors affecting the information asymmetry ratings that
we excluded from this study. The results are hoped to contribute extending our understanding how
information asymmetries can be decreased in outsourced IS development projects and how using
agency theory to could contribute in resolving these risks.
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